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EFFORTS TO APPLY THE FEDERAL
CRIME OF EXTORTION TO LABOR-
RELATED VIOLENCE
LAURENCE J. COHEN* AND TERRY R. YELLIG**
INTRODUCTION
One of the more controversial provisions in the revised criminal
code proposed in the Ninety-Sixth Congress was the definition of the
crime of extortion. Specifically, a difference of opinion arose over
whether the federal crime of extortion should include acts occurring
during a legitimate labor dispute which are designed to obtain legiti-
mate employment benefits. Present law exempts such acts from prose-
cution as extortion.
The criminal code revision bills reported to the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate for consideration during the second session of
the Ninety-Sixth Congress contained different definitions of the crime of
extortion. Senate bill 1722 (S. 1722) included a definition of extortion
which would have, in some cases, overruled the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Enmons,' that efforts by labor unions to obtain
improved terms and conditions of employment cannot constitute extor-
tion as defined in the Hobbs Act,2 even when accompanied by violence,
property damage, or similar coercive conduct. House bill 6915 (H.R.
6915), on the other hand, would have preserved the Enmons decision.
* Partner, law office of Sherman, Dunn, Cohen, Leifer & Counts, Washington, D.C.;
LL.B., Yale University, 1959; B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1954.
** Partner, law office of Sherman, Dunn, Cohen, Leifer & Counts, Washington, D.C.;
J.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1972; B.A., The American University, 1968.
1 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976). In pertinent part the Hobbs Act provides:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts
or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property
in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(Q) As used in this Section-
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or
under color of official right.
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The Ninety-Sixth Congress adjourned without acting on either the
House or Senate bills.
Its opponents in Congress have attempted since 1973 to overrule
Enmons in every session of Congress which has considered revision of the
Federal Criminal Code. The wisdom of the two versions of the crime of
extortion as defined in the most recent House and Senate criminal code
revision bills can best be considered after the disparate definitions are
examined. This examination justifies adoption of a definition of extor-
tion which preserves the Enmons interpretation whenever the Congress
again considers this issue.
THE HOBBS ACT
In 1934, Congress enacted a statute, commonly known as the Anti-
Racketeering Act,3 which was designed to penalize extortion in connec-
tion with trade or commerce. The 1934 Act was modified in 1946 by the
Hobbs Act in order to eliminate an exception which permitted the pay-
ment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee.4 Sub-
sequently, in 1948, the original Hobbs Act was reenacted without
substantial change as 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 5
The Hobbs Act was Congress' response to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in United States v. Local 807 International Brotherhood of Teamsters,6
which ruled that section 2 of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 did not
forbid the exaction of money in the form of a wage demand by threats of
violence from an employer for payment to a putative employee who per-
formed no services for the money, but made a good faith tender of the
services which he was willing to perform but which the employer re-
jected.
The Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 proscribed, in connection with
3 48 Stat. 979. Section 2 of the Act provided:
Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any degree
affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving or about to move in
trade or commerce-
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use
force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable considerations, or
the purchase or rental of property or protective services, not including, however, the
payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent induced by wrongful use of
force or fear, or under color of official right; or
(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physicial violence or physical injury
to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate sections (a) or
(b); or
(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other person or persons to commit any
of the foregoing acts; shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a felony and shall be
punished by imprisonment from one to ten years or by a fine of $10,000, or both.
4 60 Stat. 420, ch. 537.
5 62 Stat. 793, ch. 645; see note 2 supra.
6 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
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interstate commerce, the exaction of valuable consideration by force, vi-
olence or coercion, "not including, however, the payment of wages by a
bona fide employer to a bona fide employee."'7 In Local 807, the
Supreme Court held that this exception covered New York City Team-
sters who by violence or threats exacted payments from out-of-town
truckers in return for the unwanted and superfluous service of driving
out-of-town trucks to and from the city. Teamsters would lie in wait for
the out-of-town trucks and then demand payment from the owners and
drivers in return for allowing the trucks to proceed into the city. The
Teamsters sometimes drove the arriving trucks into the city, but in other
instances the out-of-town truckers paid the fees but rejected the Team-
sters' services and drove the trucks themselves. There was evidence in
several cases that the Teamsters, having exacted their fees, disappeared
without offering to perform any services at all. The Court held that the
activities of the Teamsters were included within the wage exemption to
the Anti-Racketeering Act, even though the work they performed was
unneeded, unwanted, and in some cases rejected.
The Court decided Local 807 in March, 1942. Hearings on three
bills addressed in part to the Local 807 decision were held by a subcom-
mittee of the House Judiciary Committee in April and May, 1942.8 At
the conclusion of the hearings, Representative Hobbs defended his bill,
H.R. 6872, but stated that he proposed to substitute a new bill, 9 expres-
sing the theme of the history of the enactment of the Hobbs Act.
[The elements of the crime denounced by this bill are essentially the same
as the elements of robbery or extortion. The only added element is inter-
ference with interstate commerce .... [T]he revised bill should include
conspiracy and attempts to commit such a crime, but the essence would be
interference with interstate commerce by robbery or extortion.
This bill is grounded upon the bedrock principle that crime is crime,
no matter who commits it, and that robbery is robbery and extortion, ex-
tortion, whether the perpetrator has a union card in his pocket or not. 0
Representative Hobbs reiterated this argument in debate on the
House floor in 1943 and 1945, stressing that the reach of the bill was
limited to robbery and extortion in the conventional senses."
H.R. 32, which became the Hobbs Act, eliminated the wage excep-
tion that had been the basis for the Local 807 decision.' 2 But, as fre-
7 48 Stat. 979; see note 3 supra.
8 Hearings Before Sucomm. No. 3 of the Committee on theJudiiag, on HE 5218, H.R. 6752, and
H.R. 6872, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1942) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R 5218, 6752 &
6872].
9 Representative Hobbs did introduce a new bill, H.R. 7067, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942),
reported in H. REP. No. 2176, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
10 Hearings on H.R 5218, 6752 & 6872, supra note 8, at 426-28.
11 89 CONG. REc. 3217 (1943); 91 CONG. Rsc. 11900, 11912 (1945).
12 The Hobbs Act also eliminated the proviso in section six of the Anti-Racketeering Act
1981]
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quently emphasized during the House debates, the limited effect of the
bill was to shut off the possibility opened up by the Local 807 case that
union members could use their protected status to exact payments from
employers for imposed, unwanted, and superfluous services. 13
By eliminating the wage exception to the Anti-Racketeering Act,
the Hobbs Act did not, however, reach violence during a strike to
achieve legitimate collective-bargaining objectives. The debates repeat-
edly emphasized that the bill did not "interfere in any way with any
legitimate labor objective or activity," 14 and that "there is not a thing in
it to interfere in the slightest degree with any legitimate activity on the
part of labor people or labor unions. . . . 15 Congressman Jennings,
responding to a question concerning the Act's coverage, said the Act
"does not have a thing in the world to do with strikes."' 16
Thus, the coerced payment for a rejected stand-by job, where no
employment relationship existed and no services were rendered, was the
target of the Hobbs Act. 17 Representative Hobbs directed his remarks
to this mischief when he stated that, "the sole and simple purpose, the
of 1934: That no court of the United States'shall construe or apply any of the provisions of
this Act in such manner as to impair, diminish, or in any manner affect the rights of bona-fide
labor organizations in lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, as such rights are
expressed in existing statutes of the United States. § 6, 48 Stat. 979. That provisio was one of
the supports for the Local 807 decision. See 315 U.S. at 535. It was eliminated to prevent
reliance on that clause as a means of reustitating the Local 807 decision. See 91 CONG. REc.
11912 (remarks of Rep. Hobbs) (1945).
13 This bill is designed simply to prevent both union members and nonunion people
from making use of robbery and extortion under the guise of obtaining wages in the
obstruction of interstate commerce. That is all it does. . . [T~his bill is made necessary
by the amazing decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the United States against
Teamsters' Union 807, 3 years ago. That decision practically nullified the anti-racketeer-
ing bill of 1934. . . . In effect the Supreme Court held that. . . members of the Team-
sters' Union. . . were exempt from the provisions of that law when attempting by the
use of force or the threat of violence to obtain wages for a job whether they rendered any
service or not.
91 CONG. REC. 11900 (1945).
14 Id. at 11841 (remarks by Rep. Walter).
15 Id. at 11908 (remarks of Rep. Sumners). See also id. at 11900 (remarks of Rep. Han-
cock); id. at 11904 (remarks of Rep. Gwynne); id. at 11909 (remarks of Rep. Vursell).
16 Id. at 11912 (remarks of Congressman Jennings).
17 Congressman Hobbs forcefully rejected the idea that strike misconduct, as such, is ex-
tortionate:
Mr. Marcantonio. All Right. In connection with a strike, if an incident occurs which
involves-
Mr. Hobbs. The Gentleman need go no further. This bill does not cover strikes or any
question relating to strikes. ...
Mr. Marcantonio. That does not answer my point. My point is that an incident such as
a simple assault which takes place in a strike could happen. Am I correct?
Mr. Hobbs. Certainly.
Mr. Marcantonio. That then could be extortion under the gentleman's bill, and that
striker as well as his union officials could be charged with violation ofsections of this bill.
Mr. Hobbs. I disagree with that and deny it in tolo.
89 CONG. REc. 3213 (1943).
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single purpose, of this bill is to do the best we can to protect interstate
commerce and free the highways and streets of this country of rob-
bers."' 18 The rhetoric of various Congressmen was understandably im-
precise, but their concern was the exertion of actual or threatened
violence to compel an employer to pay for nothing or nearly nothing.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE HOBBS ACT
Proponents of the Hobbs Act defended it as not encroaching on the
legitimate activities of labor unions, on the grounds that the new statute
incorporated New York's definition of extortion "the obtaining of
property from another. . . with his consent, induced by a wrongful use
of force or fear, or under color of official right."'19 Felonious intent to
misappropriate another's property is an essential element of extortion
under New York's law.20 The court in People v. Cuddihy2' stated that
"[t]he intent to extort for gain must be wrongful and unlawful 'to obtain
that which injustice and equity the party is not entitled to receive.' The
ultimate object and intent of the party here accused was not 'luai causa'
which must always characterize the act." In People v. Sheridan,22 the court
stated that "[tihe unlawfulness lies in the motive. If its purpose be un-
lawful, then the act (which under other conditions might be justified)
becomes unlawful."
This section of the New York Penal Code was interpreted in People
v. Dioguardi.23 The Court of Appeals of New York construed the term
"force," used to define extortion in the New York statute, as including
coercion, physicial violence, destruction of property, and economic loss
other than that induced by a lawful strike. In Dioguardi, the defendant
received payments from an employer which were, in effect, to buy an
end to peaceful organizational picketing. The court stated that the
otherwise lawful picketing became criminal when its purpose was to ex-
act payment other than wages from the employer.2 4
18 91 CONG. REC. 11912 (1945).
19 NEw YORK PENAL LAW § 850 (McKinney 1909). See 91 CONG. REc. 11842 (remarks
of Rep. Walter); id. at 11843 (remarks of Rep. Michener); id. at 11900 (remarks of Reps.
Hancock and Hobbs); id. at 11906 (remarks of Rep. Robsion). See also United States v.
Caldes, 457 F.2d 74, 77 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 686 (3d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964).
20 Note, Labor Faces The Amended Anti-Racketeering Act, 101 PA. L. REV. 1030, 1037-39
(1953).
21 People v. Cuddihy, 151 Misc. 318, 324, 271 N.Y.S. 450, 456 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1934), aj'd,
243 A.D. 694, 277 N.Y.S. 960 (1935).
22 People v. Sheridan, 186 A.D. 211, 213, 174 N.Y.S. 327, 329 (1919). See also People v.
Weinseimer, 117 A.D. 603, 616, 102 N.Y.S. 579, 588 (1907).
23 8 N.Y.2d 260, 168 N.E.2d 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1960).
24 Id. at 271, 168 N.E.2d at 690-91; 203 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
The picketing here. . . may have been perfectly lawful in its inception (assuming it was
1981]
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Accordingly, under New York law, when the object of the lawful
activity is the personal enrichment of the actor rather than the economic
betterment of the worker, it is extortion. On the other hand, where the
end is attainment of a legitznate labor objective, there is no extortion
because there is no intent to misappropriate property.25 Thus, "the col-
lection or attempted collection of union dues," where there "is no claim
that the dues were used for personal gain as distinguished from union
activities . . . cannot be blackmail or extortion. The felonious intent
necessary to sustain a conviction for these crimes is wholly lacking." 26
Extortion does not exist where the proof is insufficient to establish be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the accused "was actuated by the purpose
of obtaining a financial benefit for himself or his codefendants and was
not attempting in good faith to advance the cause of unionism .... "27
This principle was followed by a federal court applying the Hobbs
Act in United States v. Kramer 2 8 where a union leader threatened an em-
ployer with labor trouble if he was not paid a sum of money. Similarly,
in United States v. Hyde ,9 the Attorney General of Alabama and his aide
were convicted of a Hobbs Act violation for threatening life insurance
and loan companies with state action, which could lead to the closing of
their businesses, unless payments were made to them. The court there
held that the "wrongful use of an official right may be a basis for extor-
tion.."30
The federal courts have limited the Hobbs Act to the use of force,
violence, or threat of violence to obtain wages or money in the context of
a labor dispute. In United States v. Kemble, 3 Truck Drivers and Helpers
Union Local 676 and one of its business representatives were indicted
for violence against a nonunion truck driver who attempted to unload
merchandise from his truck. The union business representative forcibly
insisted that the truck driver employ a helper referred by Local 676 to
part of a bona fide organizational effort) and may have remained so-despite its poten-
tially ruinous effect on the employers' businesses-so long as it was employed to accom-
plish the legitimate labor objectives of organization. Its entire character changed from
legality to criminality, however, when it was used as a pressure device to exact the pay-
ment of money as a condition of its cessation.
Id.
25 People v. Dioguardi, 8 N.Y.2d 260, 168 N.E.2d 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1960), dircussed
in United States v. Caldes, 457 F.2d 74, 77-78 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. Barondess, 133 N.Y.
649,31 N.E. 240, 16 N.Y.S. 436 (1892); People v. Weinseimer, 117 A.D. 603, 102 N.Y.S. 579
(1907).
26 People v. Gassman, 182 Misc. 878, 885-86, 45 N.Y.S.2d 709, 715 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1943),
qft'd, 268 A.D. 377, 51 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1944), afd, 295 N.Y. 254, 66 N.E.2d 705 (1946).
27 People v. Adelstein, 9 A.D.2d 907, 908, 195 N.Y.S.2d 27, 28 (1959).
28 355 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.), remanded for sentencing per curiam, 384 U.S. 100 (1966).
29 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058, (1972).
3o Id. at 833.
31 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952).
[Vol. 72
CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
unload the trucks because the truck driver was not a union member.
The court concluded, after analyzing Local 807 and the legislative his-
tory of the Hobbs Act, that Congress intended the Act to include the
forced payment of wages in proper cases. Nevertheless, the court has-
tened to add that proper cases include only those involving forced pay-
ment of money for imposed, unwanted, and superfluous services, such as
those in the Kemble case.
Later, the Supreme Court adopted the same approach in United
States v. Green.32 In Green, each of the two counts of an indictment for
extortion under the Hobbs Act alleged that the extortionate acts con-
sisted of attempts to obtain from an employer "his money, in the form of
wages to be paid for imposed, unwanted, superfluous and fictitious serv-
ices of laborers commonly known as swampers, . . . induced and ob-
tained by the wrongful use, to wit, the use for the purposes aforesaid, of
actual and threatened force, violence and fear made to said [em-
ployer]. . .. -33 The Court held that the acts charged were prohibited
by the Hobbs Act. 34 Before and after Green, a series of cases held that
extortion occurs whenever a union member tries to foist himself or an-
other union member on an employer by threats of force or violence in an
effort to obtain a payoff for himself.35 None of these cases, however,
involved efforts to achieve legitimate collective bargaining objectives.
Prior to 1969, there was only one prosecution under the Hobbs Act
for misconduct which occurred during a legitimate collective bargaining
dispute, the Hobbs Act previously having been used only against un-
scrupulous officials attempting to secure payoffs. On December 9, 1969,
the District Court of Arizona returned a two-count indictment against
Theodore Caldes and Wellaine M. Lowry for violation of the Hobbs
Act. Caldes and Lowry, both labor leaders, were accused of damaging
property of the Mission Linen Supply Company by throwing green dye
on the company's laundry. The damage, although minor in each in-
stance, occurred in the midst of two years of negotiations for a collective
bargaining agreement with the company.36
The Ninth Circuit ordered the indictments dismissed in United States
v. Caldes37 because it determined that the Hobbs Act was not intended
32 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
33
.Id. at 417.
34 Id. at 419.
35 See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); United States v. Kramer, 355
F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665 (2nd Cir. 1966); Callanan v.
United States, 223 F.2d 171 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862 (1955).
36 Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 2 n.3, United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S.
396.
37 457 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1972).
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to reach low-level violence in connection with bona fide labor disputes.3 8
Three other indictments returned under the Hobbs Act in 1970 were
based on the same concept of the statute reflected in the Caldes indict-
ments. Two of the indictments returned in the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida were dismissed without opinion in June,
1979.39 The third indictment was returned on October 15, 1970, in the
Eastern District of Louisiana against Travis Paul Enmons and three
other union leaders.
THE ENMONS CASE
Each of the individuals indicted in United States v. Enmons40 was an
official of one of two local unions affiliated with the International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers, one representing employees of the Gulf
States Utilities Company, and the other representing employees of in-
dependent contractors engaged by the utility company to perform con-
struction and maintenance work. The defendants were accused of five
separate acts of violence in furtherance of a conspiracy to obstruct com-
merce, and to force the company to agree to a collective bargaining
38 The Caldes Court stated as follows:
Labor unions must be able to actively and vigorously pursue the interest of their mem-
bers at all times, provided their activity is directed toward legitimate ends. The expan-
sive interpretation of "extortion" used in the Hobbs Act as urged by the Government
would make criminal the activities of many militant labor organizations. Under the
Government's view, a labor union and its members would be guilty of extortion under
Section 1951 if they strike for higher wages in violation of their collective bargaining
agreement, because an "illegal" or "wrongful" strike to obtain higher wages constitutes a
"wrongful" use of force to obtain the property of another. Spontaneous and sporadic
fighting on the picket lines could also be condemned as the use of wrongful force and as
extortion if this view was allowed to prevail. This type of action, including the use of
violence during a strike, was the subject of congressional attention the year following
enactment of the Hobbs Act. The Taft-Hartley Act contained specific provisions which
condemned this action as unfair labor practices. . . . It is significant that during con-
gressional deliberations of the bill no congressman expressed an opinion that the Hobbs
Act of the preceding year covered union violence while a strike was in progress.
If the Hobbs Act was construed to cover acts of violence during the negotiations for
a legitimate labor goal we see a further danger that it would permit a union member to
be found guilty of extortion for mischievous misconduct even though he did not possess
the requisite felonious intent to deprive another of his property. It does not appear that
Congress intended that acts of violence which are the by-product of frustration engen-
dered by a prolonged, bona-fide collective bargaining negotiation to be "extortion"
within the meaning of the Act. Indeed, in Local 807 the Government admitted in its
brief that "Those who use coercion to secure genuine employment are engaged in [a]
legitimate labor objective; their activities, although perhaps constituting breaches of the
peace do not partake of the nature of extortion."
Finally, it appears to us that acts of vandalism of the type committed by these ap-
pellants would be more properly and suitably prosecuted in the state courts and it is
doubtful if Congress intended by Section 1951 to elevate this type of conduct to the level
of the federal court.
Id. at 78-79 (citations omitted).
39 United States v. Rutcofsky, No. 70-101-CR-JE (S.D. Fla. June 24, 1970); United States
v. Schiffman, No. 70-102-CR-JE (S.D. Fla. June 24, 1970).
40 See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396.
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agreement with one of the local unions which included higher wages
and other monetary benefits. The acts of violence included firing high-
powered rifles at three company transformers, draining the oil from a
company transformer, and blowing up a transformer substation owned
by the company.
The government contended that the Hobbs Act covers all attempts
by union members and officials, through force or violence, to obtain the
property of an employer engaged in interstate commerce. The govern-
ment also argued that the language of the Hobbs Act nowhere suggests
a special immunity for union members and officials who use force and
violence to obtain higher wages and better working conditions, simply
because these could also be obtained through lawful collective bargain-
ing.
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision with Justice Black-
mun concurring, held that the language of the Hobbs Act proscribes
interference with interstate commerce by extortion, and that the use of
violence to obtain higher wages is not within the statute's definition of
extortion.41 The Court observed that "extortion" is defined in the
Hobbs Act as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear,"'42 reasoning that the term "wrongful" modifies the entire defini-
tion of extortion and not just the proscribed means. The Court's ration-
ale was that it is always wrongful to use force, violence, or fear and,
therefore, the use of that term was intended to modify the other phrase
in the definition which refers to "obtaining the property of another."43
Consequently, the Court refused to accept the government's broad
concept of extortion-the wrongful use of force to obtain even legiti-
mate union demands of higher wages." The Court expressed skepticism
about limiting the government's concept of extortion, even though the
government conceded a possible exception for "the incidental injury to a
person or property that not infrequently occurs as a consequence of the
charged atmosphere attending a prolonged labor dispute. ' 45 Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion accepted the majority's rationale, but
41 Id. at 400.
42 Id. at 399.
43 Id. at 400.
44 .Justice Stewart observed:
The Government's broad concept of extortion-the "wrongful" use of force to obtain
even the legitimate union demands of higher wages-is not easily restricted. It would
cover all overtly coercive conduct in the course of an economic strike, obstructing, delay-
ing, or affecting commerce. The worker who threw a punch on a picket line, or the
striker who deflated the tires on his employer's truck would be subject to a Hobbs Act
prosecution and the possibility of 20 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.
Id. at 410 (footnote omitted).
45 Id. at 410.
19811
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invited Congress to consider whether extreme acts of violence of the
kind charged in the Enmons case should become federal crimes. 46
POST-ENMONS DECISIONS
Subsequent judicial decisions have consistently recognized that
"the effect of Enmons was to remove from the reach of federal criminal
law the use of coercive tactics to obtain increased wages, but with the
caveat that the prosecutor's hand would be stayed only when the pay-
ment is gained in furtherance of legitimate labor objectives."'47 Thus,
the Enmons decision has not exempted labor officials and union members
from all federal prosecution under the Hobbs Act merely by virtue of
the juxtaposition of their alleged unlawful activity with a labor dispute.
In United States v. Daley ,48 the principal officer of a Teamsters union
was convicted of a Hobbs Act violation because he requested and re-
ceived at no cost six hundred tons of stone for his personal use from an
employer then in collective bargaining with the defendant's union. The
defendant also arranged to have two members of the local union provide
their trucks to load and haul the stone after regular working hours.
Neither of the drivers was compensated by defendant for this work.
Similarly, in United States v. Quzn,49 a clergyman who was authorized to
represent certain employees of a retail store in a labor dispute was con-
victed of violating the Hobbs Act for receiving payment from the em-
ployer in return for removing a picket line around the employer's
store.50 Each of these defendants was convicted of violating the Hobbs
Act because he obtained a personal payoff through the use of coercive
tactics. 5 I Nonetheless, critics of the Enmons case are still dissatisfied.
Some have argued, for instance, that the Court's subsequent decision in
United States v. Culbert,52 drastically narrowed the holding in Enmons.
There is no basis for this interpretation of Culbert.53
Moreover, the federal government recently attempted to circum-
vent Enmons by prosecuting union officials for the destruction of two
46 Id. at 412.
47 United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955
(1976).
48 564 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978).
49 514 F.2d 1250.
50 See also United States v. Nell, 570 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1978).
51 There has also been at least one successful prosecution of a labor official for attempting
to impose unwanted or unneeded union services. United States v. McCullough, 427 F. Supp.
246 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
52 435 U.S. 371 (1978).
53 United States v. Culbert simply held that the Hobbs Act is not limited to corrupt labor
activities as held earlier in United States v. Beck, 511 F.2d 997 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 836 (1975); and United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 31 n.7 (6th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
[Vol. 72
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trucks which belonged to an employer with which the defendants' un-
ions were involved in a labor dispute. The government charged the de-
fendants with violations of the Travel Act 54 instead of the Hobbs Act.
In United States v. Thordarson ,5 the government argued that, because the
Travel Act does not contain the "wrongful taking" requirement in the
Hobbs Act, Enmons is inapplicable to a Travel Act prosecution of alleg-
edly extortionate activities of labor leaders and members. The court
disagreed, applying Enmons to the Travel Act by strictly construing the
language and legislative history of the latter; the court further observed
that the states, not the federal government, should regulate criminal ac-
tivity during strikes.5 6
These cases and others have narrowly construed the Hobbs Act
within the context of legitimate labor activity.57 There has been no ex-
pansion of Enmons and the holding in United States v. Quinn represents a
slight narrowing of Enmons. Critics of Enmons, despite the courts' consist-
ently narrow interpretation, continue to press for its legislative reversal.
54 The Travel Act provides in pertinent part that:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate
or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to...
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, man-
agement, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subpara-
graphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined. . . imprisoned. . . or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means . . . (2) extortion, bribery, or
arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
55 487 F. Supp. 991 (C.D. Cal. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1239 (9th Cir. 1980).
56 Id. at 994-95.
The Enmons rationale is as appropriate to a § 1952 prosecution as it is to a § 1951 prose-
cution. Defendants, in the case at bar, are labor officials whose unions participated in a
lawful strike. Their alleged acts are ones contemplated as part of a series of coercive
tactics to achieve the recognition of a union contract. Although, as in Enmons, the statu-
tory proscriptions arguably apply, there is no indication that Congress intended to ex-
tend the scope of a statute aimed at combatting organized criminal activity to encompass
violence arising out of a lawful strike. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed, and
any ambiguity resolved in favor of lenity. . . . Much more explicit statutory language is
required "to lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to put the Federal Govern-
ment in the business of policing the orderly conduct of strikes. .. "
Acts of violence, such as the ones alleged in the instant case, occurring during a
lawful labor dispute and resulting in damage to persons or property are punishable
under state law. However, there is nothing in the language or history of § 1952 to "jus-
tify the conclusion that Congress intended [§ 1952] to work such an extraordinary
change in Federal labor law or such an unprecedented incursion into the criminal juris-
diction of the States. . . ." Therefore, Counts 4 and 5 charging violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952 are dismissed.
Id. (citations omitted).
57 United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. at 376-78; United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721
(10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Jacobs, 543 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 431 U.S. 929
(1977).
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Each version of the recodification of the federal crimnal laws which
has been reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee has included a
definition of the crime of extortion which, to some extent, would have
overruled Enmons. Although the bill reported to the Senate during the
last session was more limited than its predecessors, it was still inconsis-
tent with Enmons. The recodification bill reported to the House during
the Ninety-Sixth Congress would have preserved the Enmons rationale,
but barely survived concerted opposition.
Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have repeatedly
struggled with the definition of "extortion," in an effort to achieve a
compromise between the competing interests which want to preserve the
Enmons interpretation and those who wish to abolish the exemption
from prosecution for otherwise prohibited activities which are designed
to obtain legitimate labor objectives. The respective definitions of "ex-
tortion" which appeared in H.R. 6915 and S. 1722 were the latest in the
line of definitions of that crime which began when the original recodifi-
cation bill, S. 1, was reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee by its
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures during the Ninety-
Fourth Congress.58
The definition of extortion in S. 1 eliminated the reference in the
Hobbs Act to "wrongful use." The purpose of this omission was "to
overturn the Enmons exception and to prohibit uniformly the use of ex-
tortionate means involving actual or threatened violence to obtain prop-
erty, irrespective of whether the property could legitimately have been
acquired in some other way."59
The Subcommittee explained in its report that the kind of picket-
line violence, to which Justice Stewart referred in Enmons,6° is not within
the ambit of the Hobbs Act because such violence is not used to exact
payment from the employer.61 Supporters of the extortion provision in
S. I argued that the report's language was sufficient to exclude minor
58 See SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL LAWS AND PROCEDURES OF SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF
1975 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter REPORT ON REFORM ACTi.
59 Id. at 649.
60 410 U.S. at 410. See also note 44 supra.
61 Apparently in part what motivated the Court in Enmons was the desire to avoid
Federal Hobbs Act coverage over unlawful picket-line violence-usually the product of
short tempers-in which minor but intentional damage is done to the property of the
employer. However, in the Committee's view such acts do not fall within the purview of
the Hobbs Act (nor should lhey be Federally punshahle) since there is no intent thereby to
obtain the employer's property through the use of force and the acts do not in fact cause
the employer to part with his property; in short, such isolated acts of violence do not
partake of the nature of extortion.
REPORT ON REFORM ACT at 624 (emphasis added).
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picket-line violence from prosecution. Nevertheless, it certainly would
have worked in an "extraordinary change in federal labor law."162 In
fact, the subcommittee report suggested that the criminality of conduct
by union leaders and members might turn on the size of the wage in-
crease or other employment benefit sought in collective bargaining ne-
gotiations.63 This proposition runs counter to the premise of the free
collective bargaining system. Fortunately, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee failed to act on S. 1 during the Ninety-Fourth Congress.
Subsequently, during the Ninety-Fifth Congress, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee reported a new version of S. 1, designated S. 1437, which
also included a definition of "extortion" substantially different from that
in the Hobbs Act.64 Again, the purpose of the definition was to overrule
the Enmons decision by removing the word "wrongful," much like its
,predecessor in S. 1. In fact, the committee report which accompanied S.
1437 included an explanation for the proposed extortion section that
was identical to the explanation in the Committee Report which accom-
panied S. 1.65 The report explained that, where violence occurs in con-
nection with collective bargaining, the question would be whether union
demands in the bargaining table were "extortionate." The omission of
the term "wrongful" from the definition of "extortion" necessarily im-
plied that some wage demands, or other demands made by unions in
collective bargaining, might be so inordinately high as to constitute
extortion. 66 Thus S.1437 contained the same flaw which the Enmons
Court found in the federal government's position in that case, that
"[t]he Government's broad concept of extortion-the wrongful use of
force to obtain even the legitimate union demands of higher wages-is
62 410 U.S. at 411.
63 The Subcommittee Report stated:
As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Enmons, thi opportunity is created for
unions or employers to cloak extortionate demands in the guise of an objective which
could be legitimately sought through collective bargaining. For instance, rather than
violate the Act (under Green) by seeking wages for superfluous services, unions may (un-
der Enmons) demand and obtain with impunitiy inordinately high wages for the perform-
ance of existing and desired services through fear instilled by violence. Such a situation
is, of course, highly undesirable.
REPORT ON REFORM ACT at 624.
64 In pertinent part S. 1437 provided:
§ 1722. Extortion
(a) Offense.-A person is guilty of an offense if he obtains property of another:
(1) by threatening or placing another person in fear that any person will be sub-
jected to bodily injury or kidnapping or that any property will be damaged; or
(2) under color of official right.
(b) Affirmative Defense.-It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under sub-
section (a)(1) that the threatened or feared injury or damage was minor and was inciden-
tal to peaceful picketing or other concerted activity in the course of a bona fide labor
dispute.




not easily restricted. '67
For instance, under the extortion provision in S. 1437, the govern-
ment would not have been required to show even that union leaders
involved in collective bargaining were aware of, or participated in, vio-
lent conduct in order to indict them for extortion, as long as there was
evidence that otherwise legitimate collective bargaining demands were
regarded by the prosecutors and the jury as inordinately high. The sug-
gestion that the criminality of conduct by union leaders or members
might turn on the amount of benefits sought in negotiations runs
counter to the premise of a system of free collective bargaining.
The affirmative defense in § 1722(b) of S. 1437 did not ameliorate
these problems. Each of the three necessary elements of the defense was
not only vague, but subject to interpretations which could have ren-
dered the defense meaningless. Moreover, the burden of proving the
elements of the affirmative defense would have been on the defendant.
As a result, a prosecutor almost always would have been able to get the
case to the jury.
Accordingly, organized labor attempted to eliminate the affirma-
tive defense in § 1722(b) of S. 1437, in order to ensure that collective
bargaining demands did not become an element of the crime of extor-
tion, and could not be the subject of prosecutorial scrutiny. For this
reason, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) introduced an amend-
ment to the extortion provision which was supposed to narrow its appli-
cation, so that violence and threats of violence in the context of a labor
dispute would not automatically become an element of the crime of ex-
tortion.68
67 410 U.S. at 410.
68 124 CONG. REc. S17 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978). This amendment was accompanied by
the following colloquy:
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. President, the only purpose of this particular amendment is to clarify
that should there be violence in the course of a labor dispute it will not be considered
prima facie evidence of extortion.
The Justice Department agreed to that degree of clarification, and that is the extent of
the amendment. That is the sum and substance of it.
Mr. Thurmond. Mr. President, I would like to make a brief statement about the amend-
ment just offered by the Senator from Massachusetts. I do not object to the amendment,
but I want to spell out its legal impact on the provisions in section 1722.
This amendment would add a 'proof' subsection designed to prevent a trial judge from
holding that, in a case described in the new subsection, mere proof that personal injury
or property damage occurred during a labor dispute constitutes a sufficient showing of
the causal relationship between the obtaining of property and the threat of fear based on
that injury or damage to justify submission of that issue to the jury. It prevents such a
holding directly by providing that proof of the coincidence of the labor dispute and the
injury or damage in such a case is not 'prima facie evidence' of the causal relationship. It
is true, of course, that such a causal relationship sometimes does exist where injury or
damage occurs during a labor dispute. This proposed subsection, however, is based on
the belief that where there is a cause and effect relationship, or the intent to obtain
property by means of a threat or fear resulting from injury or damage, it should be
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Eleven days later, near the end of debate on S. 1437, Senator Ken-
nedy made the following statement in an effort to clarify the record as to
the meaning of the new § 1722(b):
The amendment is intended to avoid an implication that if violence occurs
incidental to a labor dispute, the violence could be attributed to the union
as a tactic for extortion where there was no evidence that that was the
purpose of the violent conduct. The amendment means that more than
the mere coincidence of a labor dispute and violence is needed to show
that violence was intended to be a means of extorting anything from the
employer. A case of extortion could not be proved in a labor dispute situa-
tion just because fighting or other violence occurs-this is the intent of the
amendment.69
Despite these statements, substitution of the new proof section in
§ 1722(b) for the former affirmative defense section did nothing to elimi-
nate the problems created by the proposed extension of the crime of
extortion to activities undertaken in order to achieve legitimate labor
objectives.
The implication of both Senator Kennedy's and Senator Strom
possible to prove, in addition to that coincidence, some other circumstance adding to the
strength of the inference of causation.
The proposed subsection does not address the question of which particular additional
circumstance or circumstances, when proven along with that coincidence, will suffice to
justify the submission of the issue to the jury. One which clearly would be sufficient in
many cases to avoid a directed verdict is the circumstance that the defendant was, or
conspired with, a person negotiating on behalf of the union involved in the labor dispute.
The same result might obtain, where the repetitive or systematic nature of property dam-
age, or its exact timing, contributed to an inference, based also on the fact that a labor
dispute was pending at the time the damage was done, that the damage was purposeful
rather than mindlessly vindictive.
Mr. Allen. Does not the amendment make it harder to obtain convictions in extortion
prosecutions?
Mr. Kennedy. No, it would not. It simply clarifies the scope of the section. If there were
any examples of obvious violence involved, disorderly conduct or any other kind of vio-
lence, those could easily be prosecuted at the local level and there is nothing in this
particular amendment that would affect that.
All it says is that if there are instances of violence involved, it would not be considered
prima facie evidence of extortion. That presumption may be overcome or rebutted, and
in that sense it would require additional evidence.
Id.
69 Id. at S763-64 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978).
In fact, the Government would not even attempt to prosecute as extortion most cases of
violence associated with a labor dispute. The amendment is a recognition that tempers
often flare in labor dispute situations. In a case where there was evidence that there was
an agreement among people involved in the labor dispute to use violence against the
employer as a means of achieving the goals of the labor union, such as dynamiting a
plant, that evidence would establish a prima facie case.
In the absence of such evidence, a defendant would be entitled to dismissal of the case.
In fact, in the absence of such evidence, such matters should be left to the States, which
are fully capable of dealing with disorderly conduct, assault, property destruction, and





Thurmond's (R-S.C.) initial statements was that evidence of labor vio-
lence in conjunction with collective bargaining, plus almost any other
evidence indicating a causal relationship between the bargaining and
the violence would be sufficient to get the case to a jury. Senator Thur-
mond's statement indicated that, in addition to evidence that a union
negotiator was involved in the violent conduct, evidence sufficient to
satisfy the causal relationship requirement might include, for example,
evidence that property damage was systematic or repetitive, or evidence
of suspicious timing, presumably of either the violence or the bargaining
demands. Furthermore, Senator Thurmond's analysis, and at least Sen-
ator Kennedy's initial analysis, were consistent with the report which
accompanied S. 1437 that evidence of inordinately high bargaining de-
mands, in conjunction with evidence of violence, would also be enough
to get the case to a jury. Nothing in Senator Kennedy's later statement
altered the premise of the analyses of both Senators. The Senate passed
S. 1437 on January 30, 1978, by a wide margin. The House of Repre-
sentatives, however, failed to take action and the bill expired at the close
of the 95th Congress.
,Subsequently, a new bill to recodify the federal criminal laws was
introduced in the Senate on September 7, 1979. S. 1722 was a revised
version of S. 1437 and, therefore, initially included an extortion provi-
sion identical to the one passed by the Senate the previous year. Senator
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) introduced an amendment to the extortion sec-
tion in S. 1722, concidentally again designated § 1722, during the Judi-
ciary Committee's consideration of the bill, which eliminated the proof
section, § 1722(b), and replaced the word "wrongfully" in § 1722(a).
Senator Leahy's amendment was designed to preserve the language of
the Hobbs Act as well as the Enmons interpretation of that language.
The Leahy amendment was adopted by the Committee on Novem-
ber 27, 1979. Support for the Leahy amendment was based on two sep-
arate concerns. Several members of the Committee supported the
amendment because they agreed that federal criminal proscription of
the use of force to achieve legitimate collective bargaining demands
would upset the delicate balance in labor-management relations which
Justice Stewart recognized in Enmons. Other members of the Committee
were more concerned about the "incursion into the criminal jurisdiction
of the States" which the extortion provision in S. 1722 represented. Sen-
ator Leahy stated that state criminal authorities were better equipped to
handle local labor violence. 70 Senator Cochran (R-Miss.) concurred
70 Transcret of Proceedings. Hearing Held Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciag, Executive Ses-
sion Mark-Up on the "Criminal Code," 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (Nov. 27, 1979).
Mr. Chairman, as I stated earlier, I really think that we are dealing with an area: if we
have improper activity on the part of either the employers or the labor unions in a labor
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with Senator Leahy by stating that there was no clear need for federal
intervention in local labor disputes.7'
Opponents of the Enmons interpretation of the Hobbs Act, believing
that the inclusion of the proof section in the extortion provision repre-
sented a major concession to supporters of Enmons, threatened to block
reporting of S. 1722 to the floor of the Senate unless some compromise
was agreed upon which at least removed major acts of violence from the
protection of Enmons. Hence, the compromise version of the extortion
provision represented yet another, albeit more limited, attempt to dilute
the protection afforded by Enmons to legitimate collective bargaining
objectives. 72
Significantly, the committee report which accompanied S. 172273
indicated that the Judiciary Committee finally accepted the Enmons de-
cision,74 yet nonetheless, expressed continued rejection of an essential
proposition of Enmons, which is that the use of violent means to obtain
legitimate collective bargaining objectives, no matter how extreme,
dispute where to achieve an objective it would be a legitimate subject of collective bar-
gaining, I really think that is something that should be left up to the states.
I must admit that I feel that way: partly from my own experience as a prosecutor,
but also from prosecutors that I have talked with in other states. What I am saying
basically is that the old law made a great deal of sense. Local prosecutors, local courts,
local police: they have a pretty good idea of what is going on.
They also tend to be able to keep these things in their proper perspective. And also,
they deal directly with each other. There is no question in my mind that when the
Federal authorities move in you have very little relationship with the local authorities on
it, and it just is not handled the same way.
I really see no need. In fact, I found nothing, in going back through the testimony
of anything else that says why we should expand Federal jurisdiction in this way.
Id.
71 See id. at 6.
72 In pertinent part S. 1722 provided:
§ 1722. Extortion
(a) Offense.-A person is guilty of an offense if he obtains property of another-
(I) by threatening or placing another person in fear that any person will be sub-
jected to bodily injury or kidnapping or that any property will be damaged; or
(2) under color of official right.
(b) Bar to Prosecution.-It is a bar to prosecution under this section that the of-
fense occurred in connection with a labor dispute as defined in 29 U.S.C. 152(9) to
achieve legitimate collective bargaining objectives, unless there is clear proof that the
conduct which constitutes the threat or placing in fear required under subsection (a)(l)
consists of a felony and the conduct was engaged in for the purpose of causing death or
severe bodily injury in order to secure such objectives; and the Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division certifies in
writing that-
(A) the facts establish the existence of the additional elements of the offense re-
quired under this subsection;
(B) a federal prosecution should be commenced under this section; and
(Q) the State is unable or unwilling to proceed with any equivalent prosecution
relating to such conduct.
73 S. REP. No. 96-553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
74 Id. at 645.
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must be exempt from federal prosecution as extortion.75 Thus, even
75 The Committee Report which accompanied S. 1722 stated in relevant part:
As indicated earlier, the Committee intends to carry forward in a slightly more narrow
fashion the effect of the limiting construction placed upon the Hobbs Act in the Enmons
decision to the effect that labor officials were not covered for their extortionate activities
against employers in the course of a labor dispute, if the objective sought was a permissi-
ble goal of collective bargaining. The committee concluded that the best way to perpet-
uate this major thrust of Enmons was to provide for a bar to prosecution in circumstances
involving a labor dispute. Accordingly, the Committee has eliminated from the defini-
tion of the substantive offense itself the reference in the Hobbs Act to the "wrongful" use
of force, violence, or threats, on which the Supreme Court majority predicated its hold-
ing, and intends that in situations not covered by section 1722(b) this offense be given an
interpretation consistent with its deliberately broad language. The design of this offense
is to prohibit the use of truly extortionate means to obtain property, irrespective of
whether the property could legitimately have been acquired in some other way.
4. Bar to Prosecution
The bar to prosecution in subsection (b) of section 1722 states the careful balance
struck by the Committee between the need to include an effective extortion statute in the
new Federal Criminal Code and the need to avoid "working an extraordinary change in
federal labor law [and] . . . an unprecedented incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of
the States," and to respect Congress' "traditional reluct[ance] to define as a federal crime
conduct readily denounced as criminal by the States."
To meet the substantial concerns just noted, the bar to prosecution prohibits appli-
cation of this provision to labor disputes involving "legitimate collective bargaining
objectives" subject to the exception of the bar described below. That phrase as used in
subsection (b) encompasses activities to secure noncorrupt labor union objectives even if,
as in Enmons, those activities would violate other laws and excludes such objectives as
efforts to obtain personal payoffs or payments for superfluous services.
The exception to the bar stated in subsection (b) is intended to spell out the exclu-
sive circumstances which may give rise to a Federal extortion prosecution involving un-
lawful conduct that occurs during a labor dispute to achieve legitimate collective
bargaining objectives. In essence this exception adds two elements to the crime. First,
the government must prove that the defendant engaged in conduct against the person
which, if there were Frederal jurisdiction, would be a felony under the code. This ele-
ment requires an act and not a mere statement or threat to act. Second, the government
must prove that the defendant acted not merely "knowingly" as that term is used in the
code but with the preestablished intent to (a) cause death or severe bodily injury and (b)
by so doing to force acceptance of the union's demands. "Severe bodily injury" means
protracted disabling or disfiguring bodily injury that precludes the individual from gain-
fully working.
The phrase "clear proof," which has its origin in Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act (29 U.S.C. Section 106), as used here imposes on the government the obligation to
establish by direct evidence that the conduct against the person included in the excep-
tion was undertaken for the purpose specified therein. Without such proof, violence, no
matter how serious, during a labor dispute is outside the Federal extortion law.
In order to reinforce traditional principles of federalism the bar is not overcome
(and the Federal government may not initiate an investigation or prosecution of the
illegal conduct) unless the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant At-
torney General for the Criminal Division certifies in writing that (a) the facts establish
the existence of the additional elements of the offense required by the exception to the
bar; (b) a Federal prosecution should be commenced under this section; and (c) for rea-
sons other than insufficient evidence the State refuses to proceed with a prosecution relat-
ing to the conduct against the person specified in the exception to the bar. Such a
certification must be based on evidence obtained by or available to the State prior to the
Federal government's involvement in the matter; however, once the certification is made,




though the extortion provision in S. 1722 was a substantial improve-
ment it suffered from many of the same deficiencies which made previ-
ous versions unacceptable. Section 1722 reflected a concerted effort by
the Committee to meet the dual justifications for the Enmons holding:
avoidance of an extraordinary change in federal labor law, and an un-
precedented incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of the states. Unfor-
tunately, the draftsmen again missed the mark, and the results could
have been exactly what Justice Stewart sought to avoid in Enmons.
For instance, the bar to prosecution in § 1722(b) would itself have
had a substantial chilling effect on the right of employees to "engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection" provided in § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act. 76 Section 111 of S. 1722 defined a "bar to prosecution"
as "a ground for terminating a prosecution in favor of a defendant on a
ground unrelated to guilt or innocence." Thus, the bar to prosecution
in § 1722(b) could not be raised until a defendant was arrested and in-
dicted for extortion. Consequently, many union leaders and their mem-
bers would have been discouraged from participation in lawful
collective bargaining activities for fear that such activity might subject
them at least to arrest and indictment for extortion if violent misconduct
occurred during the pendency of the collective bargaining.
This result obtains because § 1722(b) applies to instances involving
"a labor dispute as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) to achieve legitimate
collective bargaining objects." Section 2(9) of the Act defines the term
"labor dispute" broadly, as including:
any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee. 77
Section 1722(b) added to this broad definition of a labor dispute
the requirement that it must be aimed at achieving "legitimate collec-
tive bargaining objectives." Earlier versions of the extortion provision
implied that inordinately high wage demands might not be legitimate
collective bargaining objectives. Section 1722(b) offered no guidance on
this issue. Thus, the same objections raised to the earlier versions of the
definition of extortion which appeared in S. 1 and S. 1437 were equally
applicable to the recent version in S. 1722.
Section 1722(b) also attempted to avoid an incursion into the crimi-
nal jurisdiction of the states by including a requirement that the state in
76 29 U.S.C. § 157.
77 29 U.S.C. § 152(9).
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which the alleged unlawful activity occurred must be found by the At-
torney General of the United States, his Deputy or his Assistant for the
Criminal Division, to be unable or unwilling to proceed with "any
equivalent prosecution relating to said conduct." There was, however,
no definition of what constitutes any equivalent prosecution relating to
said conduct. For instance, must the equivalent prosecution be for ex-
tortion? Does the measure of equivalency include a comparison of the
penalties under state law with those under federal law? Moreover, the
standards by which the state's unwillingness or inability to prosecute
would be measured by the Attorney General are undetermined.
Problems such as these could have rendered § 1722(b) meaningless inso-
far as it was intended to avoid incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of
the states.
These and other defects in the extortion provision of S. 1722
prompted former Secretary of Labor F. Ray Marshall to write to then
Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti on January 16, 1980, expressing
strong opposition to the extortion provision in S. 1722, and supporting
retention of the Hobbs Act definition of extortion as interpreted in En-
mons in the Criminal Code bill then pending before the House Judiciary
Committtee. H.R. 6915, as originally drafted by the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, completely overruled Enmons by adopting a definition
of extortion which prohibited the use or threat of violence to obtain the
property of another, with his consent, whether wrongful or otherwise.
On March 5, 1980, after Labor Secretary Marshall's letter sig-
nalled the Carter administration's position on the issue, the Subcommit-
tee voted to amend the extortion provision in H.R. 691578 to include the
term "wrongfully," thereby preserving the Enmons interpretation. Im-
mediately thereafter, however, Representative Sam B. Hall (D-Tex.)
proposed an additional amendment to the extortion provision which
stated that the fact that the violence committed by the accused party
was in furtherance of a legitimate objective or activity would not be a
dfense to a prosecution for extortion. Consequently, the extortion pro-
vision which the Subcommittee sent to the Judiciary Committee on
March 11, 1980 was internally inconsistent in that it preserved the En-
mons interpretation of extortion in the first subsection and then seem-
ingly overruled it in the second. 79
78 The extortion provision in H.R. 6915 was designated as section 2522.
79 The extortion provision submitted to the House Judiciary Committee, in relevant part,
read as follows:
§ 2522. Extortion
(a) Whoever knowingly threatens or places another person in fear that-
(1) any person will be subjected to bodily injury or kidnapping; or
(2) that any property will be damaged;
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Thereafter, Congressman John Sieberling (D-Ohio) introduced an
amendment to § 2522 during consideration of the bill by the full Judici-
ary Committee which completely eliminated the Hall amendment.
Congressman Sieberling explained that the purpose of his amendment
was to preserve the Enmons interpretation of extortion in order to remain
consistent with national labor policy and preserve the integrity of the
states' criminal jurisdiction. The Committee adopted the Sieberling
Amendment. Subsequently, on July 2, 1980, the Judiciary Committee
voted by voice vote to recommend H.R. 6915, as amended, to the House
of Representatives. 80 No further action was taken on H.R. 6915 during
the Ninety-Sixth Congress.
THE CASE FOR PRESERVING THE ENMONS INTERPRETATION
OF EXTORTION
Many of those who want to revise the definition of "extortion" in
the proposed recodification of the federal criminal laws simply cannot
justify what appears to be a special exception for union leaders and
members from prosecution for extortion when they use "truly extortion-
ate means to obtain property, irrespective of whether the property could
legitimately have been acquired in some other way."8' This concern
must be addressed in order to justify continuation of the Enmons inter-
pretation of extortion in a future recodification of the federal criminal
laws.
The Enmons interpretation of extortion does not give carte blanche to
hooligans and racketeers to threaten, destroy, or injure others under the
protective shield of a labor dispute. Those persons should be and are,
prosecuted under state and federal law for whatever substantive crimes
they commit. The issue is not whether such acts should be punished,
but whether the federal crime of extortion should be expanded to in-
clude violence committed during a legitimate labor dispute. The En-
mons decision and an analysis of the various interests involved indicated
that such an expansion is unwarranted.
The House Judiciary Committee Report which accompanied H.R.
6915 explained the rationale for preserving the Enmons interpretation of
the crime of extortion as follows:
By thus limiting the federal definition of extortion, the Committee is not
and thereby wrongfully obtains property of another, or attempts to do so, commits a
class C felony.
(b) (1) It is not a defense to a prosecution for an offense under this section that the
conduct constituting the offense was in furtherance of a legitimate objective or activity.
80 The extortion provision included in H.R. 6915 as reported to the House by the Judici-
ary Committee was identicial to the extortion provision quoted in relevant part in note 79
supra, except subsection (b)(1) was deleted in its entirety.
81 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 650.
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condoning the use of violence for any purpose. Rather this limitation em-
bodies the Committee's judgment that the policing, through the criminal
process, of such matters as local labor disputes is not an appropriate matter
for the Federal Government. Although the Federal Government has ex-
pressed a significant interest in ensuring the proper conduct of labor-man-
agement relations as they affect interstate commerce, the Government
already has a significant arsenal of weapons with which to attack unfair
labor practices.
8 2
The committee report explained that ample federal law applicable to
incidents of violence arising during labor disputes already exists.8 3 The
considerations which confronted the Supreme Court in Enmons are
equally relevent today. Violent misconduct in the course of collective
bargaining and attempts to coerce an employer are unfair labor prac-
tices under the National Labor Relations Act.
8 4
Thus, if a union or its agents engage in violent activities or threaten
violence, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is authorized to
proceed against the labor organization and the individuals involved.85
Remedies available to the NLRB include the authority to issue orders to
cease and desist from the specific unfair labor practices, require the of-
fending union to post copies of a notice of the Board's determination at
all union offices and meeting places, and even mail copies to all employ-
ees of the company involved,88 and publish copies of newspapers of gen-
eral circulation in the locality where the violence occurred. 7 Where the
coercive misconduct is especially serious, the Board can even decertify
the union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the affected em-
ployer's employees. 88
82 H.R. REP. No. 96-1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 299 (1980).
83 Id. at 300 n.1.
84 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1976).
85 Such activities have been held to violate § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), which makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
tion to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by § 7 of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 157, when such actions occur in contexts in which employees are likely to learn of
them. See NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977); NLRB v. Imparato Stevedoring Corp., 250 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1957);
NLRB v. Furriers Joint Council, 224 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1955); Laura Modes Co., 144 N.L.R.B.
1592 (1963). Moreover, specific intent to restrain or coerce employees is not required. See
NLRB v. Local 140, United Furniture Workers, 233 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1956).
86 NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d at 11; Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v.
NLRB, 463 F.2d 778, 779 (5th Cir. 1972); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490,495 (4th
Cir. 1972).
87 NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d at 12; J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
NLRB, 417 F.2d 533, 538-40 (5th Cir. 1969); Alexander Stafford Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 79, 82
(1957), enfd sub nom. International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. NLRB, 254 F.2d 955
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
88 NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d at 13. See also NLRB v. David
Buttrick Co., 361 F.2d 300 (Ist Cir. 1966); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 671, 199
N.L.R.B. 994 (1972); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
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In the interim, the Board has the power, upon issuance of an unfair
labor practice complaint against a union or individual members, to seek
an injunction against further violent misconduct.89 The National Labor
Relations Act also provides that any finding by the Board of an unfair
labor practice involving coercive misconduct is enforceable by the
United States courts of appeals. 90 Moreover, the Board can seek civil
and criminal contempt sanctions against respondents who refuse to com-
ply with the courts' enforcement orders. 91
In addition to the remedies provided by federal law, a number of
remedies under state law are available to victims of coercive misconduct
in the course of a labor dispute. State and local law enforcement agen-
cies can prosecute offenders under the various state and -local criminal
laws applicable to such misconduct. The House Judiciary Committee
Report accompanying H.R. 6915 observed that "no real evidence has
been produced to show that states cannot adequately handle incidents
of violence arising from labor disputes, nor that the limited resources of
the FBI could be used to investigate such incidents more effectively than
the resources of local and state law enforcement. '92
Several civil remedies are also available under state law to victims
of violence and coercion during labor unrest. State courts may enjoin
violence and threatening activity, 93 as well as award compensatory and
punitive damages for the consequences of such actions.94 In sum, there
is no need to provide the federal government with an additional means
of prosecuting such activity because of the ample arsenal of weapons
already available to deter such misconduct in the course of a labor dis-
pute.
The potential deterrent effect of the application of a federal extor-
tion statute to misconduct in the course of labor disputes is far out-
weighed by the extraordinary change in federal labor law that would
result. Indeed, it would "put the Federal Government in the business of
policing the orderly conduct of strikes." 95 Moreover, it could easily lead
to governmental abuse.
Revision of the extortion statute to overrule the Enmons decision
89 National Labor Relations Act, § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976).
90 §§ 10(e) & (0, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) & (0 (1976).
91 See, e.g., NLRB v. Teamsters Local 327, 592 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1979).
92 H.R. REP. No. 96-1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 299.
93 United Automobile Workers v. Anderson, 351 U.S. 959 (1956), a fgper cu-iam, 245
Minn. 274, 72 N.W.2d 81 (1955); Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
94 United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); UMW Dist. 50 Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); Solo Cup Co. v. International Bhd.
of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 237 Md. 611, 205 A.2d 213 (1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 976 (1965).
95 United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S-. at 411.
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would substantially disrupt the delicate balance already struck by the
Congress in the labor-management relations area. Admittedly, labor
disputes inherently involve considerable tension on both sides. Under
such circumstances, strike-related misconduct does occur. If Enmons is
overruled, any violent misconduct during an otherwise legitimate labor
dispute could become grounds for a federal indictment for extortion.
Subsection (b) of the extortion provision in S. 1722 failed to cure
this problem. Subsection (b) provided that violence during the course of
a legitimate labor dispute in and of itself would not constitute prima
facie evidence that the property was obtained by such conduct. How-
ever, it certainly did not bar a prosecution, and provided no indication
of what would constitute a prima facie case. Presumably, evidence link-
ing the defendant to the labor dispute, or testimony by the employer
that he acceded to union demands because he was in fear of the defend-
ant, could have been sufficient to support a conviction. Any legislation
which creates the possibility that union officials and members may risk a
federal indictment for extortion because of picket-line misconduct
would have a chilling effect on the exercise of their federally protected
rights to strike and to engage in any concerted activity to improve their
wages, hours, and working conditions.
These considerations support a decision to refrain from expanding
the federal extortion statute to include misconduct in the context of a
legitimate labor dispute, and adopt instead the current scope of the
Hobbs Act as interpreted in the Enmons case. This position was reflected
in the extortion provision in H.R. 6915. Preservation of the Enmons in-
terpretation is not only consistent with the National Labor Policy, but is
also consistent with the underlying principle of the recodification of the
federal criminal laws not to expand federal jurisdiction absent a show-
ing of compelling need. 96 Available evidence does not indicate that
there is a compelling need to expand the federal extortion statute into
violent activities in the course of legitimate labor disputes.
CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the proposed recodification of the federal
criminal law indicates that a definition of the crime of extortion which
will punish the use of extreme acts of violence as a means of obtaining
higher wages and other employment benefits without also including mi-
nor incidents and acts of violence inherent in labor disputes is impossi-
ble to achieve. The danger of overreaching federal jurisdiction and
overextending the intended limits of such a statute greatly outweigh any
benefit which might be gained by overruling the Enmons decision. In
96 H.R. REP. No. 96-1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 300.
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light of other federal, state, and local statutes which already prohibit the
substantive criminal actions to which the proposed expansion of the fed-
eral crime of extortion would be addressed, both policy and practice
require recognition of the Supreme Court's decision in Enmons that the
crime of extortion is inapplicable to violent misconduct in the course of
legitimate labor disputes.
